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My Neighbour, the Criminal: How memories of the 1991-1995 
conflict in Croatia affect attitudes towards the Serb minority 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how Croats view the minority Serb population in Croatia. It is based 
on focus groups, dyads and interviews conducted in Croatia in 2014 and 2015. Serbs 
constitute the ‘other’ to Croatian identity, which is defined primarily through language and 
religion. The analysis finds that the predominant war narrative related to the 1991-1995 
conflict, one of defence against a larger Serbian aggressor, influences both of these notions 
of identity, as well as perceptions of the Serb minority in the state. Participants displayed 
contradictory attitudes in a discourse that featured many key facets of the war narrative. 
Most respondents agreed Serbs should be equal members of Croatian society, but they also 
did not believe Cyrillic signs should be put up in Vukovar. The introduction of bilingual signs 
both reduced trust in government institutions and was interpreted as a continued threat 
against the Croatian people and state. 
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The predominant war narrative of the 1991-1995 conflict in Croatia has become an intrinsic 
part of how Croats view the Serb minority in Croatia.1 According to this narrative, Croatia 
and Croats were victims of Greater Serbian aggression and fought in self-defence in order to 
save the Croatian state and nation (Pavlaković 2014: 19). The narrative is nearly universally 
accepted and it is institutionally inscribed in two parliamentary declarations (The Declaration 
on the Homeland War from 2000 and the Declaration on Operation Storm from 2006). The 
key characteristics of this narrative are Croatian defence, survival, struggle and victimhood 
against a Serb, Serbian or Yugoslav (among a range of terms) aggressor, in a broken 
Yugoslav system (Banjeglav 2012; Jović 2009; Koren 2011; Pavlaković 2014; Peskin and 
Boduszynski 2003). Moreover, there exists a notion that the war is not over since to many 
individuals it continues to form a key part of their lives and issues from it remain unresolved. 
Many of these issues are defined in relation to Serbs and Serbia. The situation with Cyrillic2 
signs in Vukovar exemplifies this since it has come to be seen by Croats as an aggression 
against them, rather than an issue of minority rights.3 This article investigates how Croats 
view Serbs in Croatia and how the war narrative features in this attitude. It looks at how 
different types of institutions, such as the Church or the government, affected this. These 
issues in great part define how Serbs make up the ‘other’ in Croat identity. 
 
Serbs remain the largest ethnic minority in Croatia and make up 4.36% of the population, 
down considerably since the 1991 level of 12.2% and the 1971 level of 14.16% (Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics 2011). Moreover, although the numbers remain disputed, 217,000 Serbs 
were killed in Croatia during the Second World War by the Nazi collaborationism regime 
(Goldstein 2003: 310). The UN Human Rights Committee expressed concerns in 2015 over 
the level of discrimination and violence against Serbs and Roma, in particular (United 
Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015). Moreover, Serb 
returnees continue to struggle to access government programmes aimed at facilitating their 
return. Most recently, a Council of Europe Report (2016) expressed concern over: the surge 
of nationalism and political radicalisation having an impact on minority rights, especially in 
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war hit areas; the small number of minorities employed in public service; the limited right to 
use minority languages and scripts in certain locations; the use of hate speech in media and 
political discourse; and, the public debate concerning minorities being dominated by anti-
minority rhetoric and prejudice.4 
 
The events in Vukovar originated with the 2011 Croatian census, which found that Serbs 
comprise over one third of the population in Vukovar, thereby requiring bilingual signs in the 
city. This resulted in a series of demonstrations in Vukovar in late 2013, as well as some 
other Croatian cities, to protest this move. The initial rally involved over 20,000 individuals, 
featured slogans such as “VUKOVAR, NE ВУКОВАР”5 and was likened to previous public 
shows of support for the Croatian generals in Split. The proposed bilingualism frustrated war 
veterans and many ordinary citizens due to the wartime experience of the city. Signatures 
were also collected across the country for a referendum to change the law on minority rights 
and bilingualism.  
 
Identity, ethnic or national, involves both belonging and otherness, ‘there is no self without 
an other; no identity without alterity; no nation without rival foreigners’ (Spiering 1999: 153). 
Individuals are conscious of belonging to an ‘ingroup’ as opposed to another ‘outgroup’ and 
their behaviour is often biased towards the ingroup and against the outgroup (Langston and 
Peti-Stantić 2014; Oakes 2001; Tajfel 1978). Moreover, stereotypes about the ingroup and 
outgroups as constituent parts of identity (Joseph 2004: 76). Serbs have composed the 
‘other’ to Croatian identity and President Tuđman argued that this otherness was based on 
cultural, historical and geographical differences, which he used in his attempt to unify the 
Croatian people (Bellamy, 2003: 68).6 Political elites since then have furthered this image of 
Serbs as Croatia’s ‘radical other’ and presented them as uncivilised, non-Western and 
savage (Zambelli 2010: 1664). Unsurprisingly, there is a high degree of xenophobia towards 
Serbs in Croatia, especially returnees, who are seen as embodying this otherness and the 
collective guilt of Serbian aggression (Leutloff-Grandits 2008: 151-156). Moreover, by 
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showing how the “Other” has throughout history oppressed Croatia and Croats, it was also 
possible to argue that history was repeating itself (frequently through historical revisionism) 
and that Croatia must once again defend itself (MacDonald, 2002). 
 
The picture has since then become somewhat ambiguous. For example, in a study focused 
on the region of Slavonia, Croat respondents were for the most part prepared to reconcile 
with Serb returnees, other than those who had committed war crimes (Babić 2010: 221). 
Eastern Slavonia did feature higher tensions than Western Slavonia in this study, due to the 
severity of the war there, associated war memories and exacerbated present-day ethnic 
divisions, but primary social connections in local communities were being gradually rebuilt 
(Babić 2010: 222). The intensity and speed at which this was happening differed to Western 
Slavonia, but coexistence has once again become a part of local social fabric.  
 
The article is based on semi-structured focus groups, dyads and interviews conducted in 
three Croatian cities (Zagreb, Sisak and Zadar) and several non-urban locations in 2014 and 
2015. Zagreb was used as it is the largest city in Croatia and it remains the political and 
cultural centre of the country. It also provides an example of a large metropolis that was not 
on the frontline of the war. Sisak was selected because it was directly affected by the war, a 
domestic war crimes trial dealt with crimes committed in the city and, as an industrial hub, it 
has a larger working class population than most cities. Zadar was used since it is in a 
different region of Croatia than Sisak and was also directly affected by the war. Moreover, 
the region is known as a hotbed for Croatian right wing, often nationalist, politics. The non-
urban locations were determined based on where it was possible to find participants, 
although an attempt was made (relatively successfully) to keep the locations within a close 
distance to the three chosen cities, rather than in completely different parts of Croatia. 
 
The groups were organised with middle and high school history teachers, members of 
smaller war veterans’ associations and pensioners. Teachers were selected since they hold 
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a key role in transmitting norms and narratives to younger generations, war veterans since 
they form a highly influential part of Croatian civil society and pensioners since they had 
lived through several different types of regimes. Ideally, a focus group was held with each 
target segment, however, this was not always possible to organise. Three groups (non-
urban teachers; non-urban war veterans Slavonia and Zagreb teachers) were, therefore, 
dyads that were supplemented with further individual interviews. In total 13 focus groups and 
dyads, with a further four individual interviews, were held with 52 individuals (Figure 1 
provides an overview of these). Follow-up interviews were used, when possible to alleviate 
the risk of the social context of the focus groups from affecting the data, and they were a 
means to further explore the most interesting opinions expressed. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of focus groups.7 
Location 
Target 
segment 
Number of 
participants 
Number of follow-up 
interviews 
Zagreb Pensioners 4 2 
Zagreb War veterans 4 2 
Zagreb Teachers 2; 1; 1 0 
Zadar Pensioners 4 0 
Zadar War veterans 6 2 
Zadar Teachers 3 1 
Sisak Pensioners 5 2 
Sisak War veterans 3 0 
Sisak Teachers 3 2 
Non-urban Pensioners 5 2 
Non-urban 
(Banovina) 
War veterans 5 1 
Non-urban 
(Slavonia) 
War veterans 2 0 
Non-urban Teachers 2; 1; 1 0 
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Moreover, a brief survey was handed out to participants prior to each session to allow for 
comparison to nationally representative survey results. Focus groups were an appropriate 
primary methodological approach for this type of study since they are good at tackling 
abstract concepts and investigating issues that could be illuminated by the display of 
everyday social and cultural norms (Lewis, 2003: 60). They do not “force” opinions on 
individuals (such as surveys may do) and they strongly reflect the independence of human 
opinion by further removing the interviewer from the study (compared to individual 
interviews) and by focusing on social context, where opinion tends to be created, thereby 
increasing external validity (Söderström, 2010: 4). While focus groups allowed for an 
effective exploration of narratives and opinions that become more apparent through social 
interaction, their results are limited since they are not representative of the whole population. 
The results presented here, when not supported by nationally representative data, highlight 
only how one small segment of the Croatian public construct their view of Croatian Serbs.  
 
Participants in this study differentiated with Serbs predominantly in terms of religion and 
language. That is not to say that these are the only factors in defining modern, post-war 
Croatian identity, since the legacy of the Second World War and communism also contribute 
strongly to the Croatian sense of differentiation with Serbs. These different memories and 
associated debates have polarised Croatian society and more recent events such as the 
shouting of “Za dom, spremni” at football matches has highlighted this (Brentin 2016; 
Pavlaković 2008).8 Moreover, human rights abuses from the communist period have been 
presented as attacks by one ethnicity on another and have never been analysed in a political 
vacuum, thereby being easily appropriated for nationalistic mobilisation (Subotić 2015).  
 
National identity in Croatia is, nevertheless, strongly based on religion (Babić 2010; Smith 
1991). Throughout the fieldwork the notion of Croat Catholicism was commonly juxtaposed 
with Serb Orthodox Christianity. As much as Croats identified themselves as Catholics, they 
equally strongly identified Serbs as Orthodox. The importance of Catholicism to Croatian 
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identity has been observed among elites and Prcela (2009: 211) has even argued that it has 
been overlooked as a factor in Croatian identity.9 This identification stems from the 1945-
1990 period, when Croatian Catholicism and Croatian national identity merged, as the 
Church presented itself as the only defender of the Croatian people’s collective identity 
(Jakelić 2010: 118). In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Catholicism became an 
identity marker for Croats (Sells 2003). It became collectivistic and public; emphasised 
tradition and ascription; and, defined group boundaries towards the ‘other’ (Casanova 1994: 
217; Jakelić 2010: 197).10 During the Homeland War, many volunteers in the Croatian Army 
saw military deployment as more than just their national duty, but as a religious calling to 
defend Croatia and in some rural areas facets of Catholicism continue to provide a basis for 
resistance to centralisation and economic change (Schäuble 2014). This union is probably 
best exemplified in the expression “bog i hrvati” (God and the Croats) that is built on a 
shared Croat feeling of suffering (Schäuble 2014: 262). Today, these elements are recurring 
features in political speeches, religious sermons and in public discourse more broadly. 
 
Language is seen as fundamentally linked with the history of the Croatian people and 
language is another large differentiator between Serbs and Croats (Fishman 2006). How 
people identify themselves is in many ways language and culture specific, so identity can be 
viewed as a key function of language, equal to those of representation and communication 
(Joseph 2004). In order to legitimise modern Croatian language (especially as a language 
planning project) and a distinct Croatian national identity, Croatian linguistic identity has 
been presented as reaching far into the past (Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014: 45). The aims 
of language planning in Croatia since the 1990s have been exclusively symbolic in order to 
enhance this identity, in large part because ethnic foundations and identities in the region 
have been so hotly contested over time ( ibid. 2014: 57). Language policy was used 
exclusively in the service of national projects and purity of the language was argued to be 
essential for the survival of the narod (Kordić 2010: 9).11 This was the case not only in 
Croatia, but in the region as a whole. Elites in the region believed it to be important for each 
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nation to have its own language in order to differentiate it from other nations (ibid. 2010: 
167). Language purism was the consequence of nationalist understandings of language. In 
the 1990s, the HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, or Croatian Democratic Union, is the 
largest Croatian right wing party) became an active agent of language change since they 
saw language as the main point of differentiation with other Balkan nations, especially Serbs 
(Bellamy 2003: 146). In an effort to legitimise the Croatian nation, an attempt was made to 
erase anything from the language that could associate or remind Croats of their shared past 
with Serbs (Richter Malabotta 2004: 80). Croatian and Serbian were now different languages 
and if this difference was not visible, then it had to become so (Kordić 2010: 47).  
 
Langston and Peti-Stantić (2014), however, argue that in Croatia the government itself has 
not been the primary vehicle of language change, instead this was achieved through non-
governmental institutions with similar goals, but greater ambitions. The government rarely 
seemed eager or willing to introduce legislation or regulations to control language policies, 
even when the HDZ was in power (Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014: 145).12 Laws that did 
and do exist were rarely enforced and allowed for exceptions, while even less was done 
regarding the norms of the language (ibid.: 145). Institutions that have been actively involved 
in this process and that propagated language planning most successfully functioned in a 
similar way to language academies in other states, both before and after independence 
(ibid.: 171). These primarily included but are not limited to the Croatian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts (Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti or HAZU), the Council for the 
Norms of the Croatia Standard Language (Vijeće za normu hrvatskog standardnog jezika), 
the Institute for the Croatian Language and Linguistics (Institut za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje 
or IHJJ) and Matica Hrvatska. These are not strictly government institutions, but they do all 
have significant connections (institutional or financial) to the state, so they do not form a part 
of civil society either. The government thereby did influence language change through 
sponsorship of practice rather than by law. The paradox here is that the reason that the 
issue of a ‘minority language’ has arisen in Vukovar at all is because Croatian as the official 
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state language has been defined by law and, therefore, defined Serbian as a different 
language in need of protection. This would not be the case if the law regarded the two as 
different variants of the same language, since there would be no argument for the 
representation of multiple languages.  
 
In the 1990s the above-mentioned institutions started to encourage an exclusive view of the 
Croatian standard language that actively looked to eliminate anything related to the ‘East’ 
(Langston and Peti-Stantić 2014: 277). This exclusivity defined Croatian identity based on 
religion (Western Christian and Catholic), language (Croatian and not Serbian) and alphabet 
(strictly not Serbian Cyrillic). Croatian alphabets were defined as Latin, Glagolitic and 
Croatian Cyrillic (Horvat 2009: 18).13 HAZU even complained in 2007 to the ICTY about their 
reports intended for Croatia being written in Serbian, along a range of other complaints to 
the European Union and Western European universities (HAZU 2007). The HAZU called on 
the government to take more action in order to prevent Europe from introducing a single 
regional language for Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. This can be interpreted as reflecting 
either the Croatian public’s or elite’s fear that Europe and the West were treating Croatia as 
a part of an inferior region together with its neighbours. Whose fear it represents is 
debatable and indicative of the strange position of HAZU, since they and other similar 
institutions occupy a grey area between government institutions and civil society.   
 
These notions of identity sit alongside the dominant war narrative, which frames the 
relationship as one of aggressor and victim. In this sense, the Serbian Orthodox Church is 
seen as inherently aggressive, as opposed to the forgiving and compassionate Roman 
Catholic Church in Croatia. The Serb community is seen as taking advantage of their unique 
status in Croatia, granted to them by an open multi-ethnic state. These attitudes, however, 
feature a range of contradictions. The situation with Cyrillic in Vukovar, discussed at the end 
of this paper, exemplifies this best. The Serb community feels the effect of these discourses, 
since they are seen as undeserving of some of the rights granted to them by the Croatian 
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state. The implications of this can be exacerbated during turbulent times, such as war, 
where ingroup and outgroup relations are potentially dangerous and even a matter of life 
and death (Dugandžija 2006). They become a matter of self-defence and, especially 
because of this notion, in Croatia they can be related to the feeling that the war is not over.  
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Contradictory attitudes towards minorities  
 
Survey results on attitudes towards minorities in Croatia are ambiguous and point to a 
generally positive view of them, whereas the focus group and interview data point to a far 
more pessimistic view of the Serb minority specifically. Three general trends are apparent in 
surveys: that the Croatian public claims to view ethnic minorities in Croatia favourably, that 
they rank harmony between ethnic minorities as a low priority and that they do not believe 
localities with significant Serb populations should have signs in Cyrillic. Participants in this 
study reflected this, when asked to rate the importance of three principles of the Croatian 
constitution, ethnic equality scored lowest. Surveys by Ilišin (2011) conducted in 1999 and 
2004 support these findings (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. How important do you believe the following principles of the Croatian constitution 
to be? 
Constitutional Values 1999 2004 
Young 
people 
Young 
people 
Elderly 
Freedom (1) 91 (1) 94 (1) 95 
Respecting human rights (2) 88 (2) 92 (2) 94 
Equality (4) 74 (3) 86 (4) 87 
Social justice (3) 76 (4) 82 (3) 89 
Maintenance of the environment (5) 73 (5) 79 (6) 83 
 12 
Gender equality – (6) 79 (7) 80 
Peace building (6) 67 (7) 76 (8) 80 
Integrity of ownership rights (7) 65 (8) 73 (5) 86 
Ethnic equality (9) 58 (9) 71 (10) 75 
Rule of law (10) 55 (10) 64 (9) 79 
Democratic and multi-party 
system 
(8) 61 (11) 58 (11) 72 
Source: Ilišin (2011) 
 
The Ipsos Puls (2012) survey found that the Croatian public generally looked favourably on 
different ethnicities living in Croatia (Figure 3) but less favourably on coming into familiar 
contact with members of those ethnicities (Figure 4).  
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Figure 3. Members of different ethnicities frequently come into close interpersonal contact. 
What form of interpersonal contact would you find acceptable with the following groups? To 
live in Croatia. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
Figure 4. Members of different ethnicities frequently come into close interpersonal contact. 
What form of interpersonal contact would you find acceptable with the following groups? To 
be a member of your family. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
What is striking here is not only the negative opinion of Serbs, but of all ethnicities listed. 
This calls into question the centrality of Serbs, they appear to be liked and disliked as much 
as other groups. Participants in this study also displayed ambiguous opinions in the survey 
element. For example, a survey question regarding Serb minority involvement in the 
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development of museums dealing with 20th century Croatian history received a generally 
positive response, but as the below passages will show, strong negative opinions of the 
minority were present in focus groups, dyads and interviews. This presents another instance 
of contradiction where norms of inclusivity, expressed by the public, meet a relatively strong 
war narrative by which issues of minority rights are instead interpreted as an attack on the 
Croatian people. Moreover, this highlights the conflicting nature of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Quantitative methods can miss narratives that influence 
behaviour and individuals may be aware of the social expectations to express openness 
towards Serbs, although they may not act consistently with this opinion in specific situations 
(such as Cyrillic in Vukovar).   
 
 
The Serb minority  
 
Throughout all of the group discussions related to Serbs in Croatia, war veterans and 
pensioners were exceptionally vocal, while teachers were quiet. The two target segments 
spent much time discussing the Orthodox Church and the current position of Serbs in 
Croatia, in particular. Across all groups, however, discussion centred on the war and the role 
of the Croatian Serbs in it. Much of this focused on the notion that there was no expulsion of 
Serbs from Croatia (that they left willingly), that they committed more crimes than Croats and 
that they knew the war was coming and were, therefore, prepared for it.14  
 
All groups felt that Serbs and Serbia had not punished their own criminals the way that 
Croatia had. Various reasons were given for this, from the strength of nationalism in Serbia 
to conspiracy theories concerning political elites in the region as a whole: 
 
ZA.T.2 – The problem in Serbia is that it has not come to terms with the role she 
has played [in the war] and now the current government is quite radically 
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nationalistic… (pauses) They allow them to be Greater Serbs, chetniks, 
nationalists, this and that (follow-up interview with Zadar teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – Courts in Serbia have not convicted a single officer. They have 
sentenced a few regular soldiers, volunteers. Courts in Croatia have convicted 
highly ranked officers from colonels to generals in the Croatian Army (focus 
group with Zagreb war veterans).  
 
There was, however, disagreement over exactly what was necessary by the Serb side to be 
seen as trying their own. In the below passage, one participant felt that Serbia was doing 
enough by cooperating with the ICTY, which another participant saw as a defence of 
Serbian aggression. Accusations such as this can limit the potential for constructive debate 
about interethnic relations or even the past more generally: 
 
ZG.P.3 – Who sent [Milošević] to The Hague?  
 
ZG.P.2 – That is what I wanted to say, in the end the Serbs sent him. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Well yes, they sent him, they had to.  
 
ZG.P.3 – What more do you want?  
 
ZG.P.2 – Do not argue. 
 
ZG.P.1 – You are defending Milošević and the Serbian aggression. 
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ZG.P.3 – No! 
 
ZG.P.1 – If I need to discuss this with you. 
 
ZG.P.3 (interrupts) – This is our Croatian politics.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Do not teach me about Croatian politics, I have seen it all up close. 
 
ZG.P.3 – Do not teach me, I am older and I took part in the Second World War! I 
can read between the lines quite well (focus group with Zagreb pensioners).  
 
Pensioners and war veterans felt that Serbs, as an ethnicity, were inherently aggressive and 
hateful. Again, this was closely connected to the predominant war narrative and the feeling 
that the war is not over. In extreme cases, Serbs were seen as teaching their children to 
hate. This was compared to the peaceful nature of the Croat people: 
 
NU.P.4 – Us Croats are that kind of narod. Even though the wounds are deep 
and it is difficult for someone who has lost someone, but reconciliation will come 
from our side before it comes from theirs. Although they maybe say it is not so. 
They are simply that kind of narod.  
 
NU.P.1 – They would wage war now.  
 
NU.P.4 – Yes, they are like that. It is in their blood.  
 
NU.P.2 – Since they teach them to hate (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners). 
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This is closely related to how respondents viewed the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the 
former as peaceful and the latter as aggressive (discussed below). It is also linked to the 
general view of the Greater Serbian plan. Respondents believed that ‘Greater Serbia is an 
idea that lives on and will live on in many Serbs and generations to come’ (focus group with 
Zadar war veterans) and attempts to introduce Cyrillic signs in in Vukovar were at times 
seen as an attempt to implement this plan.  
 
Not all comments directed at the Croatian Serb community were negative. Since discussions 
predominantly focussed on the Homeland War, there were admissions across all groups that 
Serbs, although only a minority, did fight on the Croatian side in the war. Croatia was by 
some also seen as the homeland of the Serbs. Teachers generally felt that it was hard for 
Serbs during the war, while war veterans considered ‘good’ Serbs to be the ones that fought 
on the Croatian side and used stories about their neighbours to show evidence of this 
(including how they personally helped each other during the war). This is indicative of the 
strength of social ties in the local community and the results have been replicated in survey 
research (Babić 2010). Despite so many communities being destroyed, neighbours did 
protect each other and such memories have survived through the war narrative. This 
provides hope for the rebuilding of local communities, especially in war hit areas, where 
inter-ethnic tensions are particularly high.   
 
All target segments believed that Serbs overall were manipulated by Greater Serbian 
politics. This creates yet another contradiction with the war narrative’s notion of exclusively 
Croat victimhood and Serb aggression. Instead it reformulates it into Serbian state 
aggression and manipulation of all ethnicities in Croatia, painting them all as victims: 
 
SI.T.1 – The Serb minority currently has a very interesting situation. I think they 
were manipulated in this whole story. They were a tool of Greater Serbian 
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politics and Milošević used them for his own interests (focus group with Sisak 
teachers). 
 
On the other hand, the Zadar teachers, for example, thought that Serbs considered 
themselves to be eternal victims and that they were only affected by the war on the frontline. 
Serb returnees were, however, only brought up and discussed by war veterans, who 
debated the topic at length. They universally saw them as accomplices to war criminals: 
 
NU.V.5 – So I told [a Serb returnee], this war criminal, I told him ‘in you, in every 
person who returns from Serbia, I see the potential killer of my husband.’ He 
responded ‘please madam do not be like that.’ So I responded, ‘until you tell me 
who killed my husband, I have the right to think so. I can walk through the town 
with my head raised high. I have the right to say this. You are the killer of my 
husband until you reveal who actually is’ (focus group with non-urban war 
veterans Banovina).  
 
To many in Croatia, Serbs are seen as the embodiment of collective Serbian guilt and 
collective Croatian suffering (Leutloff-Grandits 2008: 151-156). Individuals have all too 
frequently employed notions of collective guilt, especially since guilt has not been 
individualised to any significant extent. Moreover, the previously cited Babić (2010: 137) 
survey found that a majority of the public was only prepared to forgive Serbs who were not. 
The combined implication of this is that, if many Serbs are seen as criminals due to their 
ethnicity (especially returnees), then readiness for forgiveness can be interpreted as low in 
Croatia.  
 
 
The forgiving Catholics and the aggressive Orthodox  
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National and ethnic identity in Croatia is closely linked to religion and the Catholic and 
Orthodox churches featured in all group discussions. They were discussed as a source of 
information on the war and the Catholic Church specifically was seen as educational and 
reliable. For example, a non-urban teacher believed the Church to be more consistent than 
any state, since it had been with the Croatian narod for 13 centuries. In many instances, 
however, the topic was laughed off.  
 
The two churches came up in other parts of discussions as well. These can be divided into 
four separate categories: opinions about both overall; the Church as a key component of 
identity; the Catholic church specifically as forgiving; and, the Orthodox church specifically 
as aggressive. Overall teachers saw all Churches as politically biased (towards the right), 
political or corrupt, although this did feature some disagreement within groups. Pensioners 
also discussed the Church, but they were not as critical, while war veterans generally 
avoided the topic: 
 
ZA.T.2 – The Islamic community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic 
Church, they all strictly adhere to. 
 
ZA.T.1 (interrupts) – Their Church.  
 
ZA.T.2 – Their flock (laughs). And the innocence of their own narod (focus group 
with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – They are politically right leaning, which is what Churches on these 
territories have traditionally been, since the time of the Turks (interview with non-
urban teacher).  
 20 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – The Church is all right but it cannot contradict what the constitution tells 
it. It has a religious function and that function it has to do. It cannot run politics. 
 
ZG.P.1 – And it does not run politics. The parliament runs politics, the President.  
 
ZG.P.4 – I am just saying my opinion, you can have yours. 
 
ZG.P.2 – I sometimes talk to some people who are quite religious, I for one am 
not, but people are unhappy about how much the church is meddling in politics, 
in things that are not really its business, its job. As I said earlier, before you 
(ZG.P.1) arrived, this Latin-American Catholic Church is actually on the side of 
the poor, but ours was in an alliance with the HDZ. It never condemned the theft, 
the cheating, nothing. They only talk like you (ZG.P.1), about how communists or 
criminals are in power. I do not think this is the role of the church. It should deal 
with religious questions. That is my opinion. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Do you know who defends the poor here? Who feeds the poor in soup 
kitchens?  
 
ZG.P.2 – I know it is the Church, but they also receive donations from the state. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Many do, even civil society organisations.  
 
ZG.P.3 – Have you (ZG.P.1) looked at the treaty between the Vatican and our 
Church? Do you know how many billions are tied into it?  
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ZG.P.1 – I do not.  
 
ZG.P.3 – Do you know how many churches have been built? How much they 
were shot at? 
 
Moderator interrupts to calm participants down (focus group with Zagreb 
pensioners). 
 
The last passage highlights the political associations that are at times made with the 
Catholic Church in Croatia, as well as the potential for disagreement associated with it. The 
common dissenting view to the above was that the Church has a role, but not a political one. 
Groups that on the whole disagreed with the above views thought that the role of the Church 
was purely spiritual: 
 
SI.T.1 – The Church is concerned with spiritual work and not political. 
 
SI.T.2 – And charity. 
 
All laugh (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – The Church talks about the Lord. And to have faith in the Lord. Not in 
Milanović.15 In him I have no faith. But in Him above I believe. That is what the 
Church says (focus group with Sisak war veterans).   
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The Church was seen as identifying ethnicity in a number of ways. War veterans especially, 
but not exclusively, did not consider only Croatia and the Croat narod to have been attacked, 
but also the Catholic Church. On the other hand they used the term Serbs (Srbi) and 
Orthodox Christian (pravoslavci) interchangeably to refer to Croatian Serbs:  
 
NU.V.3 – For [the murder of] my parents Tarbuk gave the order. The Serb, 
Orthodox, leader (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – People of the Orthodox faith, Serbs, were informed when to leave 
before the artillery fire started (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – The Church protected its Catholic narod. It knew who attacked the 
Catholics (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.2 – Today they talk about Serb villages, but these are not Serb villages, 
but Croatian villages with Orthodox inhabitants (dyad with non-urban war 
veterans Slavonia).  
 
War veterans and pensioners saw the Catholic Church as forgiving and, therefore, Croats as 
a forgiving narod. This notion came up exclusively in a spontaneous fashion in those groups 
and never came up with teachers. Forgiveness was discussed through the use of Catholic 
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symbols and language. Moreover, the topic was frequently associated with reconciliation in 
the region: 
 
ZA.V.4 – In our Catholic country they say that, in order to forgive someone, that 
someone has to ask for forgiveness. They have to be aware that they sinned. If I 
hurt someone, who will forgive me anything if I am not first aware that I have hurt 
them. Only then can I ask them for forgiveness. I also need to repent and be 
aware that I have truly hurt them and I never want to do that again. […] If 
someone truly apologised to me, maybe I would have that feeling. They have 
repented and I will forgive them.  
 
ZA.V.3 – You would, because you are Catholic (focus group with Zadar war 
veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – I am a believer. How can I forgive a criminal who does not seek 
forgiveness? This is a question of faith (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
This has the implication that forgiveness, in the eyes of these individuals, is interpreted as 
religious and specifically Catholic. The would-be sinner must, therefore, ask for it. Given 
there is a slight preponderance of citizens who believe that the Catholic Church is the 
predominant moral authority in Croatia (41 per cent agree versus 33 per cent who disagree), 
this can have far reaching consequences (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. The Catholic Church is the moral authority whose opinions should be adhered to 
by all citizens. 
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Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
Whereas only some target segments saw forgiveness as exclusively Catholic or Croat, there 
was much wider agreement across groups that the Orthodox Church was inherently 
aggressive. Consequently, there was consensus that the Orthodox Church was involved in 
the war, directly or indirectly. For example, the Zadar war veterans described coming across 
Orthodox Churches being used as ammunition storage and a non-urban teacher noted, ‘I 
know the role of the Orthodox Church in the war, it is well known’ (interview with non-urban 
teacher).  
 
 
Rights for all, but not for them (yet): Serb minority rights 
 
The special place that the Serb minority holds in Croatia, due to the legacy of the war and 
the large size of it, was reflected in discussions. Respondents felt that the minority was 
unique and that it received more rights than other minorities, as well as more rights than 
Croats in Serbia. The Serb minority was considered unique for a range of reasons: for 
I disagree completely 
20% 
I disagree somewhat 
13% 
I agree and disagree 
24% 
I agree somewhat 
21% 
I agree completely 
20% 
DK 
2% 
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getting special treatment as victims; for their perceived self-imposed segregation; for having 
to suffer for others’ crimes; due to the Law of General Pardon (Narodne Novine 1996);16 and 
so on: 
 
NU.T.1 – I think that today, some 15 years since Operation Storm17, they are 
given such rights and benefits that barely any other minority gets in Croatia 
(interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.2 – We cannot talk about any kind of reconciliation because [the Serbs] are 
equal citizens of the Republic of Croatia. No one belittles them. Just read an 
issue of the Serb Novosti,18 by the Serb National Council, and you will see what 
kind of articles are put in there. Can you in any other country write such articles 
about the country you live in, to smear it, and to still receive funds from the 
government (focus group with Sisak teachers)? 
 
Passages such as these were common. Veterans complained a great deal about the Law of 
General Pardon, which they felt gave Serbs special rights, while on the other hand teachers 
felt that the general Serb population was unique in that a few ‘bad apples’ had made it 
difficult for the whole ethnicity to live in Croatia. Generally, however, as in the above 
passages the ethnic group was often compared to others, especially Italians in Istria: 
 
NU.P.5 – Because they did not stab the Croatian man in the heart or the back. 
No Croats attacked these poor Serbs, but they attacked us. But with the Italians 
it was different. When I was in the army, I was told not to sing the songs about 
our conquest of Trieste. And we gave Trieste back. There is no more war. In 
Istria there are many Italians. But they have not hurt Croatia in any way, but the 
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Serbs wanted to put all of Croatia under the boot (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners).  
 
At times the position of the Serb minority in Croatia was compared to the Croat minority in 
Serbia and, again, there was a feeling that Croats were worse off than their Serb 
counterparts. These comparisons between the Serb minority and other minorities led to a 
feeling that the Serb minority should not, but does, receive more rights than other minorities. 
The reasons for this can be divided into four broad categories, each of which features many 
examples. First, because of what they have done and the legacy of that, so they do not 
deserve more rights until the country is de-mined or the missing persons are found. Second, 
because of what they do today, such as voting based on ethnicity. Third, because of what 
they may do in the future, for example to attack once again (this is connected to the notion 
that the war is not over). Finally, they should not receive more rights because Croats in 
Serbia do not.  
 
 
Cyrillic  
 
The issue of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar illustrates the inherent contradictions present in how 
Croatia and Croats deal with the Serb minority in the country. While nearly all respondents 
felt that Serbs should have the right to Cyrillic signs, they also felt that it was too soon to put 
them up in Vukovar. No date was, however, given for when the right time might be. While 
the Serb minority was for a variety of reasons seen as undeserving of this right, all segments 
agreed that the government created the issue in the first place. Survey results point to 
similarly contradictory outlooks.  
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Across a range of longitudinal measures, attitudes towards ethnic minorities can be 
interpreted as open and positive. The Kolstø (2011) survey asked a range of questions 
related to this topic and found that:  
 
 Ethnic and civic identity were of nearly equal importance, although civic identity 
ranked higher than ethnic. 
 Respondents felt they had the most in common with inhabitants of Croatia, 
regardless of ethnicity, rather than members of their ethnicity living abroad.  
 There was some disagreement over whether ethnicities in Croatia were treated 
equally (44.3 per cent felt they were, 45.7 per cent felt they were not), although 
this does not indicate if respondents were unhappy with how Serbs, Croats or 
any other ethnicity were treated. Results from focus groups and interviews in this 
study indicate that it may be the case that Croats are being seen as treated 
unfairly. On the other hand, the regions that felt strongest that treatment was 
unequal (and therefore answered ‘no’) were Zagreb, Hrvatsko Primorje, Gorski 
Kotar, Rijeka and Istria, regions that also displayed the most openness towards 
Croatian Serbs in the rest of the survey. Slavonia, which on the other hand did 
not display this, featured the most respondents who felt that treatment was 
equal. Babić’s (2010) longitudinal results further support this difference between 
the regions.   
 Both majority and minority groups were strongly (79.8 per cent) seen as 
deserving equal rights. In other words, that no one deserved special rights.  
 For the most part interethnic relations were regarded as positive or at the very 
least rarely negative (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. How do you evaluate interethnic relations in Croatia. Do you think they are… 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
 Interethnic relations were also seen as having improved in the last ten years 
(Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. How do you compare current interethnic relations in Croatia compared to ten years 
ago? Are they now… 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
 The Ipsos Puls (2012) survey also found that respondents overwhelmingly 
felt that ethnicities should not live alone in their own states.  
 
The above stand in stark contrast to the strong objection to Cyrillic signs in Croatia. The 
same Kolstø (2011) survey found that respondents were predominantly opposed to the 
10.0% 
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49.3% 
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61.9% 
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introduction of such signs in villages and towns with significant Serb populations (Figure 8). 
Participants in this study reflected this nearly universally.  
 
Figure 8. Do you think that the names of villages and towns with significant Serb populations 
should be also written in Cyrillic? 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
That is not to say there was consensus among participants or groups on the issue as a 
whole, but all participants agreed that this policy ought not to be implemented at the time. 
Respondents universally argued that introducing Cyrillic signs in Vukovar and in Croatia 
more broadly was not the same. Vukovar as the ‘hero city’ was frequently raised as the 
reason for why it was too soon to do so: 
 
NU.T.3 – But we all forget that Cyrillic is also a Croatian alphabet.  
 
NU.T.4 – Yes. And formally as well, but this means something different to them. 
 
NU.T.3 – Something different, that is right.  
Yes 
16% 
No 
78% 
DK-Ref 
6% 
 30 
 
NU.T.4 – Those wounds are still too fresh. I do not know, if I were from there, to 
have lived through it, I do not know how I would react. Currently I have no 
dilemmas about Cyrillic in Vukovar, just like Istrians have no problems with 
Italian. And they should have because the Italians occupied them, they 
depopulated them and everything. But they do not have a problem, 40 years 
have passed, and they do not have a problem.  
 
NU.T.3 – Yes, yes. 
 
NU.T.4 – Maybe in 50 years in Cyrillic in Vukovar will also not be a problem 
(dyad with non-urban teachers).  
 
- 
 
ZG.T.2 – To me it is absurd that, not to mention so recently after the end of the 
war, in our hero city they are trying to force this. These are political games, but it 
is absurd. Horrible (dyad with Zagreb teachers).  
 
At times this was seen as a continuation of the war and an act of aggression. It, thereby, fit 
into the dominant war narrative:   
 
ZA.T.1 – They are pouring salt on people’s wounds. I do not know how someone 
even came up with the idea to put [the signs] right there.  
 
ZA.T.2 – Someone wrote that law and they knew that is could be used in 
Vukovar. Obviously whoever was making this law was not aware of the 
geography and population, or it is simply a case of negligence.  
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ZA.T.1 – Yes.  
 
ZA.T.2 – The state is at fault (focus group with Zadar war veterans).  
 
- 
 
SI.V.1 – This is a provocation! They are even waging war in peacetime (focus 
group with Sisak war veterans).  
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – If I were in power, I would put this Cyrillic on two signs, one at the front 
of [a group of Serbs], one at the back. And then send them over the Danube. 
Who knows how to swim, who does not (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners). 
 
The language employed in many of these passages is highly symbolic (‘hero city’), 
accusatory (‘this is a provocation’), emotional (‘blood from the war has not dried yet’) and at 
times even aggressive (‘and then over the Danube’). This highlights the significance of the 
issue and of the potential for Vukovar and Cyrillic to stir up emotions. As already noted in 
some of the above passages, the introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar was across all 
groups seen as the fault of the government and as a political game of some kind. In extreme 
instances it was seen as a provocation or even an attack from Zagreb: 
 
ZA.V.6 – Cyrillic in Vukovar and Cyrillic in Croatia is not the same thing. Cyrillic 
in Vukovar is a grenade from Zagreb directed at Vukovar. Zagreb is attacking 
Vukovar (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 32 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.1 – The blood from the war has not dried yet, from the killing of the people 
in Vukovar and they are bringing, the Prime Minister is bringing signs with Cyrillic 
to put on… Even a blind man can see that this is a first class provocation. A 
provocation (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
All target segments connected the issue of Cyrillic in Vukovar primarily with the Croatian 
government, at least as the initiator of this effort, and not necessarily with the Serb minority. 
Overall it was seen as proof of special treatment of the Croatian Serb community. At times 
they were seen as a victim to party politics and at other times as an ally of the ‘infiltrated’ 
government. Some saw it as a method for politicians to hide real problems, such as the 
economy, while other saw it deeply mired in party politics and blamed either the SDP or the 
HDZ: 
 
SI.T.2 – This is political. 
 
SI.T.1 – Against the current government.  
 
SI.T.2 – Yes, the current government is using Cyrillic to annul greater problems 
than Cyrillic. 
 
All agree. 
 
SI.T.1 – It is cheaper to put up 100 signs than to remove loss making companies 
and to revitalise economic life. 
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SI.T.3 – You need to know that here, as soon as big problem arises. 
 
SI.T.2 – A smaller one appears. 
 
SI.T.3 – A media war starts. A new Cyrillic! A new Milošević! 
 
SI.T.1 – Pure politicisation.  
 
All agree 
 
SI.T.3 – Always (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
One group of war veterans even saw it as a method for preventing Croats from getting jobs. 
In this discourse Cyrillic in Vukovar is interpreted as much more than an issue of minority 
rights, but instead it is seen as a threat to Croatian jobs and as a continuation of the 
Croatian struggle for independence. Despite that all groups acknowledged Cyrillic was also 
a Croatian alphabet and formed a part of the Croatian cultural heritage, many nevertheless 
felt it had been misappropriated and had become dangerous, since it could and was 
separating people. Given that both the SDP and HDZ were at times blamed for language 
problems, it is possible that what started as a 1990s HDZ policy of language change has 
come to be accepted by the majority of the mainstream political spectrum. The Croatian 
language and associated alphabets may have become one of the primary sources of 
national and ethnic identification across the majority of Croatian society.  
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Conclusion 
 
Participants in the study reflected the notion that Croatian identity is largely defined by 
religion and language. These elements are contrasted with the ‘other’ to Croatian identity, 
Serbs. Whereas Croats see themselves as Catholic, speaking Croatian and writing in Latin, 
Serbs and Serbia are seen as Orthodox Christian, Serbian speaking and writing in Cyrillic. 
This ‘other’ is also greatly defined by the war narrative, so the Orthodox Church is seen as 
aggressive, as opposed to the forgiving Catholic Church. Not only were Croats attacked 
during the war, but also so was the Catholic Church, and general notions of reconciliation 
are seen as highly based on religion. Croatian identity is, however, based on a much 
broader set of historical factors and especially the legacies of the Second World War and 
communism. Together, they help construct how Croats view Serbs.  
 
All participants agreed on only two notions: that Serbs fought on the Croatian side (and do 
not, therefore, all constitute the enemy) and that Cyrillic signs should not be put up in 
Vukovar. This exemplifies the core contradiction in the Croat view of Serbs. It is, however, 
worth noting that teachers stood out in their lack of debate on this topic, whereas war 
veterans and pensioners discussed it at length. The general impression was that Serbs were 
not seen as deserving more rights, despite respondents expressing openness towards 
minorities in general. Much of this dynamic was embodied in discussions about Cyrillic signs 
in Vukovar. A range of survey results and participants’ comments across all groups indicated 
that ethnic minorities had a right to their own language, but that Serbs could not receive this 
right in Vukovar at the present time. This created a stark contradiction between general 
openness towards minorities, but no openness towards Serbs right now, with no indication of 
when the time might be right. Participants across many groups, in a discourse that featured 
numerous facets of the war narrative, interpreted Cyrillic in Vukovar as an aggression 
against Croatia, instead of as an issue of minority rights. This discourse offered no rational 
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solutions or visions of the future, instead it was dominated by emotion and, in particular, 
anger.  
 
This study showed was how a small number of individuals experienced the 1991-1995 
conflict, how they remembered it and how this affects their views of the Serb minority in the 
country. Some are still reliving the war on a daily basis and, alarmingly, this same group also 
felt their old neighbours, now back, were all potential perpetrators at worst and witnesses at 
best. Participants overall distrusted institutions meant to protect them and, as if by 
association, also their Serb neighbours, the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Their memories were not only laced with emotion, they were defined by it. 
 
The ingroup versus outgroup dynamic in this instance has an implication for the Croatian 
Serb minority in the country, which in the eyes of the majority Croat public continues to be 
defined by the war narrative. The introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar seems to have had 
the effect of simultaneously reducing trust in government institutions and making Croats feel 
threatened by a perceived Serb threat. The implications of this become more dangerous and 
pronounced in any instance of higher tensions, violence or war, when outgroup membership 
can become life threatening.    
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1 The Homeland War, or Domovinski Rat, was the name given to the 1991-1995 conflict in 
Croatia by the Tuđmanist narrative of the 1990s (Jović 2009). The term can be interpreted 
as loaded and only representing the Croat side of the conflict, but it has come to be 
accepted across most of Croatian society since the 1990s. Today it is commonly used in 
Croatian politics, culture, education and media. Violence erupted in Croatia in 1991 as the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia gathered momentum, and lasted until 1995. The conflict 
encompassed much of Croatia and left 13,000 – 16,000 dead and 500,000 internally or 
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externally displaced (Goldstein 2003). To this day 2,138 individuals remain missing and 
many of the over 2 million mines laid in the country are yet to be demined. The conflict in 
Croatia ended following two Croatian military offensives, Operation Flash and Operation 
Storm, and the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. 
The events of the war have since then been the subject of both domestic and international 
war crimes trials. Serbia and Croatia have also both filed genocide suits against each other 
at the International Court of Justice.   
2 The Cyrillic alphabet originated in the 9th century with the disciples of Saints Cyril and 
Methodius, who brought Christianity to the region to south-eastern Europe. In Serbia it forms 
a large part of the Serbian literary heritage and is today one of the two alphabets used to 
write standard modern Serbian. In Croatia, on the other hand, only the Latin alphabet is 
used.  
3 The Croatian city of Vukovar, on the Serbian border in the northeast of the country, was the 
scene of an 87-day siege by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Serbian paramilitary 
forces in 1991. It was the most badly damaged Croatian city during the war and following its 
fall, a number of war crimes took place in and around it. Prior to the war it was one of the 
most ethnically diverse parts of Croatia.     
4 For more information on the current status of the Serb minority in Croatia also see the Serb 
National Council (Srpsko narodno vijeće or SNV) sponsored SNV Bulletin #6, available at: 
http://snv.hr/file/attachment/file/bilten6-compressed.pdf 
5 This translates to “Vukovar (in the Latin alphabet), not Vukovar (in Cyrillic).” 
6 Croatian transition from Yugoslav socialism was not to liberal democracy, but to the 
competitive authoritarian regime of President Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica or Croatian Democratic Union). Formal democratic institutions were 
in place, but they were primarily a means for Tuđman’s HDZ of obtaining and exercising 
political authority, which meant conventional standards of democracy were not met. Tuđman 
was a Major General in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) before becoming a historian in 
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1961. He was dismissed from the University of Zagreb and expelled from the League of 
Communists in 1967 for his nationalist views, specifically for protesting over the unification of 
the Croatian and Serbian literary languages. He also served two prison sentences in the 
1970s for anti-communist and anti-Yugoslav views. Tuđman died in 1999 and the HDZ lost 
the parliamentary elections in 2000 to a centre-left coalition that began Croatia’s process of 
transition to liberal democracy in earnest. 
7 If a dyad was held with, for example, two additional individual interviews then this is 
denoted as “2; 1; 1”. 
8 “Za dom, spremni”, literally translated to “for the home, ready”, was the official salute of the 
NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska or Independent State of Croatia), the Croatian fascist 
puppet state during the Second World War. It was led by the Ustasha movement and was 
responsible for the mass killings of a high percentage of Croatian Serbs, Jews, Roma and 
political opponents (most notably Partisan fighters). Chief among the incidents of the salute 
being used in public events was the shouting of the salute by a Croatian national team 
football player, Josip Šimunić, to a crowd of 25,000 spectators in Zagreb in November 2013. 
For an overview of the incident and all of the extensive reactions to it (including by media, 
elites, sports governing bodies and so on) see Brentin (2016). 
9 Matica Hrvatska, the institution behind the cited publication, is a non-governmental 
organisation devoted to Croatian literature and culture. Its aims also include the promotion of 
Croatian national and cultural identity, and it has played an important role in the history of 
the standard Croatian language. The extent of its connection to government, despite being 
an NGO, is debated and discussed later in the paper.  
10 It is important to note that this is not universal among the Croatian public or political elites. 
In 2009 President Stjepan Mesić had a highly public dispute with the Croatian Catholic 
Church over the place of Catholic symbols in public institutions.  
11 Narod can be taken to mean people or nation, defined in an ethnic sense. The word is 
composed of the root rod, from the verb roditi, to give birth (Hayden 1996: 791). By 
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definition, this view of the people or the nation only encompasses those of a specific 
ethnicity. Narod was left in the original Croatian form in excerpts to highlight this.   
12 Langston and Peti-Stantić (2014) base this analysis on a model that divides level of 
language planning into macro (government) and micro (academic institutions; scholarly 
literature; and, communication with society) levels. 
13 “Croatian” Cyrillic is also known as “Bosnian” or “Western” Cyrillic. It was used in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from the 11th until the 18th century and saw resurgence in the 1990s, amid 
various nation-building aspirations. It is similar to Serbian Cyrillic, although it was never 
standardised, and has featured in debates over its historical origins (Bosnian, Croat or 
Serb).  
14 The idea of Serb preparation was partly based in fact, since arms shipments from the 
Yugoslav People’s Army were prior to the beginning of the conflict, in October 1991, 
rerouted and left unlocked in Knin so that local Serbs, informed of this in advance, could 
obtain them (Ramet 2002: 58). 
15 Zoran Milanović was President of the left-wing Social Democratic Party of Croatia 
(Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske or SDP) 2007-2016 and Prime Minister of Croatia 
2011-2016. 
16 The Law of General Pardon (Zakon o općem oprostu) was passed in 1996, following the 
end of the war. It protected former members of Serb forces from prosecution, other than for 
serious human rights violations (Narodne Novine 1996). 
17 This is factually incorrect, since Operation Storm had (at that stage) taken place nearly 20 
years prior to the interview.  
18 Novosti is a weekly magazine published by the Serb National Council (SNV).  
